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Buying a Sports Team as an Investment: Cuban's Mavericks

· 7 min read

Buying a sports team is rarely an investment in the sense most former operators mean the word. A franchise is priced by scarcity — a capped number of teams, and the wealth of whoever the league will approve next — not by the cash it sends its owners. It tends to consume capital rather than distribute it. The people who do best by one buy it for the fun, and say so plainly.

Mark Cuban said exactly that. Months after Yahoo acquired Broadcast.com, the streaming company he co-founded,2 in a stock deal worth billions,1 he bought majority control of the Dallas Mavericks from Ross Perot Jr. for roughly $285 million.3 The team had spent most of the 1990s near the bottom of the league.4 Asked about the financial logic, he offered none: he bought it because he loved basketball and wanted to have fun. He sat in the stands rather than a suite, argued with referees, and paid league fines that became a running feature of his ownership. Decades later he sold majority control to the Adelson and Dumont families at a valuation in the billions, keeping a minority stake.5 The ending looks like a brilliant investment. The beginning is the instruction.

Three questions settle whether a franchise belongs anywhere near capital a family expects to live on. Not the coach, the local broadcast deal, or whether a city will help pay for a building — those matter only after these three have been answered without costume.

Is the price a claim on cash, or a claim on one of thirty chairs?

The governing principle is that a franchise is priced by scarcity the league itself controls. The National Basketball Association has thirty teams,6 and a thirty-first exists only if the current owners vote to create one. No rival can start a competing team in a garage, and every incoming buyer has to be approved. National media money is negotiated once and divided among the clubs. What a team is worth, then, is whatever the next qualified bidder will pay for one of thirty chairs — a number driven far more by how many people in the world can write that check than by ticket sales in a given season.

An operating business is priced the other way round: by the cash it can be expected to produce over its life, which is why its value can be reasoned about from the inside. A franchise cannot be. When Cuban bought the Mavericks they were not a cash machine, and the value of the asset climbed anyway, because national television contracts grew, the pool of people able to buy a team grew, and the number of teams did not. He ran it with obvious energy, but he did not manufacture that gain by running it well. He captured it by holding a scarce seat through a period when the seat became more coveted. In that one respect — a price set by desire rather than by distributions — a franchise has more in common with gold held after a sale than with a company.

What changes if the answer is "no, this one really is a business"? Occasionally it is. Perot's group had bought the Mavericks a few years earlier with a downtown arena and the district around it in view7 — a property plan with a basketball team attached. A franchise that comes with an owned arena booked year-round, land beside it, and a profitable media operation should be underwritten like any other acquisition, with the team treated as the marketing arm of a real-estate and broadcasting business. Most franchise purchases are not that. Most are a painting with a payroll.

Can the rest of the capital carry an asset that only asks?

The governing principle is that a trophy asset consumes cash on an open-ended schedule, and its owner has to be able to fund it from other wealth for as long as they hold it, expecting nothing back in the meantime. Player costs rise with league revenues. An owner who wants to win pays the luxury tax — a league penalty on payroll above an agreed line, steep enough to be felt. Buildings need renovating or replacing. Minority partners get asked for more capital rather than handed distributions. And the stake is illiquid in the strongest sense of that word: it cannot be sold in a week, because the pool of buyers is tiny, the league vets each one, and a sale can take a year or more to close.

Cuban could absorb all of that because the Mavericks were a modest fraction of what the Broadcast.com sale had delivered. He spent on players, on the building, on the fines, and none of it threatened anything outside the arena. The purchase was sized so that it could fail completely as an investment and leave the rest of his life untouched. That proportion is what founders in the same position most often get wrong. A price can look small next to headline exit proceeds, but those proceeds are rarely all liquid, all after tax, and all free of other purposes.

What changes if the answer is no — if the team would have to pay for itself, if debt is required, or if it would be a third or more of the family's investable capital? Then the asset is too big for the balance sheet, however appealing the franchise. A trophy that must perform stops being a trophy. The owner starts cutting payroll to force a margin, which alienates the fans and erodes the very prestige that justified the price; or, worse, better assets elsewhere get sold at the wrong moment to feed the thing that was supposed to be fun. Founders who want an operating business with customers and cash they can inspect are facing an entirely different decision — the one in buying a business after selling. A team is not a substitute for it, however similar the two sound when described as buying something to run.

Has the real motive been said out loud before the money moves?

The governing principle is classification: naming the purpose before the purchase sets the standard the asset will be judged by, and an asset judged by the wrong standard disappoints even when it delivers. The indulgence is not the failure. The failure is filing the indulgence as an investment so that a family meeting never has to hear what the money is actually for.

Cuban's candor was a form of governance. By saying it was never an investment, he fixed the terms on which the next twenty years would be evaluated — whether he enjoyed it, whether the team won, whether the building filled up. Measured that way, the purchase delivered within a few seasons, and the financial outcome that arrived decades later was a windfall nobody had underwritten. Many exited founders are drawn to a franchise for reasons they would never put in a memo: a public role, a reason to be somewhere on a Tuesday night, something a city knows them for after the company that made them is gone. Those are legitimate uses of wealth, and they speak directly to the identity question that follows most exits. A team answers them more completely than almost any other asset.

What changes if the memo still says "uncorrelated alternative" and never says "this would be a thrill, and here is what the family is willing to spend on a thrill"? Then the purchase becomes a governance problem. The family office manages it like a business, measures it on a yield it was never built to produce, and everyone ends up dissatisfied with something that did exactly what it was bought to do. Heirs inherit an illiquid, cash-hungry public role they may not have wanted. Naming the motive does not make the purchase wise; it makes it a category. An indulgence with a ceiling is spending. An investment that is secretly an indulgence is a problem that compounds quietly, because nobody is permitted to call it what it is.

What the three answers decide

Taken together they make the decision simple to state, if not always easy to make. A franchise is a scarce object, so its price is set by other bidders rather than by its operations. It consumes capital, so it has to be small enough to lose entirely. And it is bought for reasons that are not financial, so it should be judged by those reasons and no others. Cuban's purchase satisfied all three, which is why the Mavericks were a success for him long before any valuation caught up. An owner who answers any one of the three the other way should let the next franchise go to somebody else.

This is historical discussion of a third party's purchase, offered for illustration; it is not a recommendation to acquire any asset. Readers thinking through where exit proceeds belong will find more in the capital allocation library.

Sources

Figures marked with a superscript were checked against these sources on November 17, 2026.

  1. Yahoo, Broadcast.com Merging in a $5.7-Billion Stock Deal latimes.com — Yahoo acquired Broadcast.com in a stock deal worth billions.
  2. Mark Cuban | Britannica Money britannica.com — Mark Cuban co-founded Broadcast.com.
  3. Timeline: It was 15 years ago that Mark Cuban bought the Mavericks star-telegram.com — Mark Cuban bought majority control of the Dallas Mavericks from Ross Perot Jr. for roughly $285 million.
  4. List of Dallas Mavericks seasons en.wikipedia.org — The Dallas Mavericks spent most of the 1990s near the bottom of the league.
  5. Dumonts buy out Miriam Adelson's shares of the Mavericks dallasnews.com — Mark Cuban sold majority control of the Dallas Mavericks to the Adelson and Dumont families at a valuation in the billions, keeping a minority stake.
  6. About the NBA nba.com — The National Basketball Association has thirty teams.
  7. Carter sells Mavericks to Perot upi.com — Perot's group had bought the Mavericks with a downtown arena and the district around it in view.