Buying a Business After Selling: The Huizenga Habit
Buying a business after selling one makes sense for owners who can name, in a single sentence, the specific method they would carry from the company they sold into the company they want to buy — and who accept that they are choosing a job, not an investment. Owners who cannot write that sentence are usually better served owning good businesses that other people run.
In 1987, a man who had made his fortune in garbage was talked into visiting a video-rental store1 and did not want to go. Wayne Huizenga had spent two decades building Waste Management from a single truck route into the largest trash hauler in America,1 and had stepped back from the daily work three years earlier1 with more money than he could spend. Video rental, to his mind, meant a dim shop with a curtained room at the back. A former Waste Management colleague, John Melk, who had bought into a Blockbuster franchise,1 had to walk him through the door. What he saw inside — bright lights, thousands of tapes on open shelves, families in the aisles, a computer tracking every cassette — did not change his view of movies. It changed his view of the store. He recognised the shape of a business he already knew how to run.
A garbage route and a video store were the same business
The thing to understand about Huizenga's second act is that he was never especially interested in films. He was interested in a pattern, and the pattern was the one his first career had taught him.
Waste Management grew the way it did because trash hauling in the 1960s was a cottage industry: thousands of family-owned companies, each with a few trucks and a few towns, each run by an owner who was tired, or aging, or had nobody to sell to. Huizenga had started at the bottom of that trade in Fort Lauderdale in the early 1960s, with a used truck and a short list of accounts,1 running the route before dawn and selling the rest of the day. The national company came at the end of the decade, when he merged his operation with relatives hauling trash around Chicago.2 It went public in 19713 and used its own shares as currency to buy small haulers by the hundred, putting them on common systems as it went. The genius was not in garbage. It was in seeing that a fragmented local service with a repeatable unit — a truck, a route, customers who pay every month — could be stitched into something national far faster than the owners of those routes believed possible.
Blockbuster in 1987 was that same raw material in a different costume. David Cook, who founded the chain in Dallas,4 had built something unusual for the trade: a large, clean, computerised store in an industry otherwise made up of corner shops with a few hundred tapes. There were fewer than twenty locations.5 Huizenga and two former Waste Management colleagues, Melk and Donald Flynn, put in roughly $18 million for shares and the right to buy more6 — enough to control the company — and then Huizenga did what he had always done. He opened stores at a pace the trade had never seen, bought regional chains whole, imposed one operating manual across all of them, and used a rising stock price to fund the next round of purchases.
The lesson owners tend to draw from this is that Huizenga had a great eye for growing industries. That is the wrong lesson, and it is precisely the one most likely to get a newly liquid founder into trouble. He did not have an eye for industries. He had one playbook and applied it only where it fit. He proved that a third time in the mid-1990s, taking control of a company then called Republic Waste Industries7 and pointing the same method at car dealerships — tens of thousands of independent, family-owned operations, a repeatable unit, a buying experience customers disliked, and plenty of owners ready to sell. It became AutoNation, the largest auto retailer in the country. He is widely credited with building three Fortune 500 companies,8 and the three industries had almost nothing in common. The structure of the opportunity was identical every time. (He also bought sports franchises along the way, which were a different sort of purchase entirely, and he never pretended otherwise.)
That is the mechanism, and it is worth stating plainly because it carries the whole argument. A second business works for an exited founder when the founder's actual skill — not industry knowledge, not energy, not a thick contact list, but the specific thing they do better than other people — is something the new business needs, and the old business merely happened to be the first place it was exercised. Huizenga's skill was consolidating fragmented markets. Garbage was just where he found out.
The three quiet years were already a buying program
When he stepped back from Waste Management in 1984,5 Huizenga was, by any sensible measure, finished. His wealth sat in the stock of a large public company he had built. He could have sold it down over time, spread the proceeds across the market and some property, and lived several lifetimes on the income. That is the path most advisors would sketch, and it is not a bad one; this publication has argued more than once that concentration is the risk an exit is supposed to resolve, not recreate.
What he actually did in those three years is more revealing than the Blockbuster purchase itself. The gap was not a considered pause. He spent it buying small private businesses — hotels, pest control, lawn care, bottled water, portable toilets — by the dozen,9 none of them famous, all of them the same motion aimed at smaller targets. Blockbuster was not a thunderbolt that interrupted a retirement. It was a habit that found a bigger target once a former colleague brought him one.
This is the part of the story that applies to almost everyone in the first year after a sale. Founders who have just exited often treat an inability to sit still as evidence that their capital belongs back in an operating company. It is evidence only of an inability to sit still. The twelve months after a sale are a poor laboratory for deciding what kind of owner to become, because the calendar is empty and the old reflexes are not. A Friday with nothing due feels, to people who have spent decades running something, like a moral failure — a feeling well enough known to have earned its own name in the months after an exit — and it is dangerously easy to dress that feeling up as a strategy. Huizenga did not dress it up. He said, in various ways over the years, that he was a builder rather than a manager and that building was simply who he was.12 The honesty is worth copying. The speed is not.
The crowd that gathers after a visible sale is familiar in milder form to nearly every owner in this position. Acquaintances and intermediaries arrive with companies. Some are sincere, some are selling a seat in a deal, and all of them flatter the same nerve: the suggestion that a person who has run one business successfully is the missing piece in another. Flattery is not diligence. A company that is interesting only because somebody said it needs an operator like that is a company nobody has yet examined.
The check that became the chair
Blockbuster did not begin as a plan to go back to work. Huizenga was clear, years afterward, that he had not intended to run the company when he wrote the cheque. He took the chairman's seat only after the men who founded the chain left.
The friction that pushed them out was about the job, not about movies. Cook wanted to grow mainly by franchising — selling the name and the system, letting other people own the stores and carry the operating risk. Huizenga wanted company-owned stores and acquisitions, the Waste Management method pointed at a new trade. Franchising, in his view, spread the name without building the thing. He was not buying a concept to admire from a distance; he was buying a format he meant to multiply, and multiplication required an owner inside the daily decisions. The founder left. Headquarters moved to Fort Lauderdale, a short drive from Huizenga's house,10 and for a stretch he drew no salary and practically lived at the company.
That sequence is the mechanism newly liquid owners miss when they discuss buying a business as though it were a line on a statement. A minority holding, a board seat and a Saturday-morning visit is one arrangement. A controlling stake — enough of the company to decide who runs it — is another thing entirely. Employees, lenders and landlords do not experience the second arrangement as an investment. They experience it as a boss, whether or not the buyer intended to be one.
Two consequences follow for owners weighing a purchase in the year after a sale.
The first is that "I will stay close but not run it" is a sentence the purchase itself can void. If the existing founder is tired, undercapitalised or simply finished, the new money becomes the management. Huizenga discovered this within months. The useful test is not what the buyer hopes the role will be; it is what happens to the role if the person currently doing the job walks out next quarter. A deal that assumes the founder stays is a plan built on someone else's stamina.
The second is that speed feels like competence to people who have just sold. A deal closed in days is not proof of elite pattern recognition. Often it is just what a restless buyer looks like when the seller is also in a hurry. Relief on the other side of the table is not the same thing as a fit.
Underneath both sits a category error. "Should I buy another business?" sounds like an allocation question — one option alongside bonds, listed shares, property and private funds. It is not. It is a career question wearing an allocation question's clothes. Huizenga was not weighing Blockbuster against a portfolio; he was weighing it against retirement, and he found retirement intolerable. The money followed the decision rather than driving it. Owners who get this backwards — who buy because the proceeds are sitting in a money market fund and idleness feels wasteful — make an allocation decision that arrives with a full-time job attached, and they tend to discover the job part late, when the business needs attention a passive owner cannot give and the capital is already committed.
The sentence an owner has to finish before looking at a single deal
There is a practical way to use all of this, and it does not require anybody to be Wayne Huizenga. Before examining a single target, an exited owner should try to complete this sentence: the thing I did at my last company that would make the next one materially better is ______. Not "I am a good operator." Not "I know how to build teams." Something specific enough that a stranger could read it and tell whether a given business needs it.
The answers fall into three groups, and each points somewhere different.
The sentence is about an industry. "I understand commercial HVAC distribution in the Southeast better than almost anyone." That is a genuine edge, and it is the one most founders actually hold. But it transfers to one place: back into the trade they just sold. That path exists and has its own logic — it is roughly the route Howard Schultz took — and it is usually blocked for years by the non-compete the buyer insisted on. Owners in this group who buy in a different industry are not deploying an edge. They are hoping general competence will substitute for specific knowledge, which is how a household accidentally buys a job it cannot do.
The sentence is about a method. "I know how to buy small, owner-run companies, put them on one system, and keep the customers while the founder leaves." That is Huizenga's sentence, and it is rarer than people think — a skill many claim and few have practised at scale. It travels across industries because it is not about the product; it is about a structure that recurs in many markets. Even then the target has to be chosen for the pattern rather than the appeal. Huizenga passed over plenty of attractive industries because they were already consolidated: there was nothing for the playbook to do.
The sentence does not come. This is the most common outcome and the most useful one. Many excellent companies were built on timing, a product insight, an opening market and an enormous amount of personal effort — and none of those is a transferable method in the sense the test requires. That is a description of most successful businesses, not a criticism of them. An owner who cannot finish the sentence is not choosing between running a company and owning a portfolio. They are choosing between a job they would have to learn from scratch and owning good businesses without the job.
The sceptical reader will have an objection ready, and it is a fair one: it worked. Three companies, three times, at enormous scale. Why shouldn't an owner with fresh liquidity attempt a smaller version? Because the record is the product of one structural method matched to one temperament in conditions that cooperated — and because the cases that get written about are, by definition, the ones that worked. For every garbage hauler who built Blockbuster there are many more exited founders who bought a restaurant group, a dealership or a regional distributor and spent five years and a large share of their proceeds discovering that what they were good at did not travel. The right response is not to argue with the odds but to notice what Huizenga did differently. He did not buy a business he wanted to own. He bought a business whose problem he had already solved.
The leaving was part of the habit too
The part of the story usually skipped is the exit, and it matters as much as the entry.
Huizenga sold Blockbuster to Viacom in 1994 in a merger valued at more than $8 billion when it was announced, paid largely in Viacom shares11 — a value that moved with Viacom's stock price in the weeks before the vote. He stayed on in a senior title for a transition measured in months rather than years. He was not volunteering to manage that decline from the inside. Selling to a buyer that wanted the stores as a piece of a larger entertainment machine is the clearest kind of strategic sale: a decision to hand over a model that had reached the natural end of its expansion. Owners who copy the buying phase and skip the leaving phase end up owning exactly the chapter he spent a career avoiding — the long, grinding years after rapid growth slows, when the business no longer needs a builder, only a manager.
The limits of the habit showed up later, in a commercial hygiene company he backed with a former lieutenant. The same motion was applied: buy up small operators, standardise, scale quickly. The programme ran into accounting problems and the business was eventually sold off to a larger competitor. The habit was intact and the capital was intact; the conditions that had made the earlier chapters look like infallible judgement were not. A repeated motion does not guarantee a repeated outcome, and a famous earlier success does not underwrite the next attempt. None of this is a view on any of these companies as investments today; the point is the job he kept choosing, not a scoreboard.
Which brings the question back to where it actually sits. For owners in the first year after a sale, the real decision is not what to do with the proceeds. It is what the next decade of weeks should look like, and whether there is a specific method — nameable, written down, recognisable to a stranger — that would make a particular company meaningfully better with that owner inside it. When the answer is yes, buying an operating business is a continuation of a life rather than a bet on one, and the capital is simply the means. When the answer is no, the restlessness is still real, but it is a feeling rather than a thesis, and the honest move is to find the work that answers it somewhere other than a balance sheet. Proceeds do not require a job to justify them.
Sources
Figures marked with a superscript were checked against these sources on November 4, 2026.
- MAKING MONEY AT FAST FORWARD AFTER CONQUERING TRASH WORLD, TYCOON TACKLES VIDEO RENTALS sun-sentinel.com — In 1987, Wayne Huizenga visited a video-rental store after being talked into it by a former Waste Management colleague named John Melk.
- History of WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. fundinguniverse.com — Waste Management was formed when Huizenga merged his operation with relatives hauling trash around Chicago at the end of the 1960s.
- WMX Technologies Inc. encyclopedia.com — Waste Management went public in 1971.
- Blockbuster (retailer) en.wikipedia.org — David Cook founded the Blockbuster chain in Dallas.
- H. Wayne Huizenga, Owner of Teams and a Business Empire, Dies at 80 nytimes.com — When Huizenga first invested in Blockbuster in 1987, there were fewer than twenty locations.
- The Making of a Blockbuster web.archive.org — Huizenga and two former Waste Management colleagues, Melk and Donald Flynn, put in roughly $18 million for shares and the right to buy more in Blockbuster.
- HUIZENGA TAKES REPUBLIC REINS, STARTS 'FOURTH STEP' sun-sentinel.com — Republic Waste Industries
- H. Wayne Huizenga | Automotive Hall of Fame automotivehalloffame.org — Huizenga is widely credited with building three Fortune 500 companies.
- Wayne Huizenga nytimes.com — After leaving Waste Management, Huizenga spent the following years buying small private businesses including hotels, pest control, lawn care, bottled water, and portable toilets.
- Blockbuster video timeline sun-sentinel.com — Blockbuster's headquarters moved to Fort Lauderdale after Huizenga took control.
- Blockbuster's Investing Led To Merger nytimes.com — Huizenga sold Blockbuster to Viacom in 1994 in a merger valued at more than $8 billion when it was announced, paid largely in Viacom shares.
- Wayne Huizenga, Empire-Builder in Videos and Trash, Dies at 80 ndtvprofit.com — Huizenga said, in various ways over the years, that he was a builder rather than a manager and that building was simply who he was.